



Matte Blanco's thought and epistemological pluralism in psychoanalysis

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It can be seen that, although psychoanalytic pluralism is widespread, there is still a spirit of intolerance among the different theoretical schools. Matte Blanco's work allows us to think about these questions in a fresh way. Direct psychic experience, felt to be an indivisible whole, is characterized by the symmetrical mode (close to the unconscious) and projects itself in a multiple and decondensed manner on to the asymmetrical mode (consciousness, thought). Thus, psychical facts (for example, what the patient says and feels during the session) can be accounted for by multiple conscious representations which, however, are not mutually contradictory (e.g. in different theoretical approaches). Affective factors linked to the hope of reviving 'oceanic feelings' of fusion with a unified and unifying theory of the subject–analyst are also explored insofar as they lead to the tendency of analysts to exclude one another.

Keywords: epistemology, Matte Blanco, pluralism

Psychoanalytic theories are so numerous and varied that Greenberg (1995, p. 5) has written:

... a century after Freud and Breuer announced that they had discovered a cure for some of the world's most intractably incurable afflictions, little of the familiar foundations of psychoanalysis remains unchallenged ... Virtually all the traditional conceptual, clinical, and epistemological premises that guided psychoanalysis through its first hundred years are being called into question.

Yet a spirit of intolerance can often be noted between the different schools (Kirsner, 2000). It has even been suggested that this can be traced back to Freud himself (Gunther Perdigao, 2007). This subject has been widely documented and debated. For example, the 2009 IPA International Congress, in Chicago, had as its theme, 'Psychoanalytic practice: convergences and divergences'. So, is psychoanalysis one or plural? (One psychoanalysis or many? asked Wallerstein [1988]). *I will attempt to show here that certain notions contributed by Matte Blanco enable us to approach the question of pluralism in psychoanalysis in an original way and foster greater freedom of thought.* I will tackle this subject from the angle of interpretation: are there 'good' and 'bad' interpretations in analysis? Every analyst of goodwill will reply that, as the psyche is polysemic, it is open to

¹Translated by Andrew Weller.

several interpretations. But what an illusion! In practice, things are very different; thus Poland (2009, p. 253) reminds us that between analysts discussion often takes place more along the lines of reciprocal supervision than of real mutual respect.

To begin, I will recall succinctly the main lines of Matte Blanco's theory (1968, 1975a, 1988) (see also Carvalho *et al.*, 2009; Rayner, 1995).

Matte Blanco: A reminder

Two principles reign in the unconscious: the *Principle of Generalization* and the *Principle of Symmetry*. The first means that elements standing in analogical relationship with each other are included in ever more general sets or classes, and that, within these sets, the Principle of Symmetry means that these elements become indistinguishable from each other. For example, an analyst, a teacher, and a father, who are clearly distinct for the conscious mind, can be grouped together in the unconscious under one and the same class, according to their analogical relationship, which Matte Blanco calls *Propositional Function* (i.e. belonging to the class of 'those who exert authority'). Next, the Principle of Symmetry means that they are indistinguishable: for instance, in the transference, at certain moments, a father and an analyst are experienced as being wholly similar. Symmetry also means that propositions set out in one sense only (that is, asymmetrically) in consciousness, can be reversed in the unconscious. For example, A is the father of B is incompatible for the conscious mind with B is the father of A, but not for the unconscious; or if an element x (for example, temporal or topographical) is situated before an element y , in the unconscious, the converse can be true and y can be situated before x . In the end, all sense of order disappears and everything can be confused with everything else. To give an example: the paranoid subject confuses the persecutory attitude he displays with the one he fantasizes is being directed against him – subject and object are thus confused. As regards time, this directly evokes the Freudian notion of the *timelessness* of the unconscious; and as regards space, Matte Blanco has described an unconscious *spacelessness* subsuming Freudian condensation and displacement. This is directly reminiscent of the rules Freud (1915, pp. 186–7) established concerning unconscious functioning: displacement and condensation characteristic of primary psychic processes, timelessness, absence of contradiction, replacement of external reality by internal reality.

Gradually, then, increasingly large *classes* (or *sets*) are formed in the unconscious, comprising an infinite number of elements. For example (Matte Blanco, 1988, p. 55), if an individual, Rosa Torres, happens to be a mother, the unconscious will consider her more as "a mother" than as "the individual" Rosa Torres, for what counts is mainly the fact that she belongs to the "class of mothers". Then, she will be considered more as "a parent" than as "a mother" (the class of 'mothers' being merely a sub-set of the class of 'parents'); then, more as a "relative" (a larger class than that of 'parents'); then as a "human being"; then more as an "animal"; then as a "living thing", etc., *ad infinitum*. This line of reasoning began with the conscious perception of an individual and led to the unconscious perception of a *class*

composed of an *infinite number of elements* (all mothers, all parents, etc., real and potential, etc.). Furthermore, owing to the principle of Symmetry, individuals and classes finally fuse together into a 'great indivisible whole' (which Matte Blanco calls a *Basic Matrix*).

Matte Blanco proposes that *the most fundamental division which exists in the mind is not that which separates the conscious from the unconscious, but that which separates the symmetrical mode from the asymmetrical mode*. With the first the Principle of Symmetry holds sway, and with the second asymmetrical relations are preserved. From this point of view, if the symmetrical mode is unconscious, it is not due to repression but because consciousness is unable to apprehend it directly. For example, if one says: this father and this analyst are one and the same (symmetrized), it is plain that, at the conscious level, we speak *successively* (thus separately) of the father, *then* of the analyst. But it is not possible to think of them both *simultaneously* at the conscious level: one thinks first of one, and *then* of the other. The notion of an 'unrepressed unconscious' is thus established – a notion, moreover, that was employed by Freud² (1923) in *The Ego and the Id*.

We have just gone from consciousness (asymmetry) towards the symmetrical mode (unconscious). For example, we have seen that an individual mother (perceived consciously) could be rendered equivalent (in the unconscious) to all the other women belonging to the class of mothers. But if we go in the reverse direction, that is, from the symmetrical unconscious towards the asymmetrical conscious, we understand that an unconscious, symmetrized situation is able to deploy out into an infinite number of asymmetrical conscious derivatives (differentiated from each other). So, for example, a woman perceived in a dream – a dream which lays bare the unconscious – may be represented in consciousness by all nourishing women, in actuality or intellectually: teachers, mothers, women analysts, etc., and these nourishing women, real or imaginary, symbolic or embodied, existent or conceivable, can be potentially infinite in number. *Thus, a particular situation in a psychotherapy, for instance, a patient's narrative, can be subject to multiple conscious translations or multiple possible interpretations, united by an analogy existing between them (see examples below)*.

Furthermore, Matte Blanco (1975a, pp. 409 ff) has proposed some geometric considerations which will help us pursue our line of reasoning. He shows how, when a triangle ABC, appearing in a space of two dimensions,

²Freud states: "For our conception of the unconscious, however, the consequences of our discovery are even more important. Dynamic considerations caused us to make our first correction; our insight into the structure of the mind leads to the second. We recognize that the *Ucs.* does not coincide with the repressed; it is still true that all that is repressed is *Ucs.*, but not all that is *Ucs.* is repressed. A part of the ego, too – and Heaven knows how important a part – may be *Ucs.*, undoubtedly is *Ucs.* And this *Ucs.* belonging to the ego is not latent like the *Pcs.*; for if it were, it could not be activated without becoming *Cs.*, and the process of making it conscious would not encounter such great difficulties. *When we find ourselves thus confronted by the necessity of postulating a third Ucs., which is not repressed, we must admit that the characteristic of being unconscious begins to lose significance for us*" (1923, p. 18, my italics).

is projected on to a space of one dimension (a line), its points (A, B, C) repeat themselves (see Figures 1 and 2).

What was condensed in two dimensions is multiplied, then, when it is *deployed* in one dimension. At the next level, that of three dimensions, this is reiterated on a larger scale. Matte Blanco (1988, p. 90) thus establishes that:

If we generalize we may say that the greater the difference between the number of dimensions of the initial geometrical figure and of the final one we are considering at a given moment, the greater the number of the figures which are ‘born’ from the original figure will be ... In other words, what in an *n*-dimensional space was only one geometrical figure will become a number of different figures in a lower dimensional space.

Moreover, he refuses to think that the comparisons that we make between the mind and geometry (e.g. psychical structure, the deep ego, displacement, etc.) are only artificial (Matte Blanco, 1975a, pp. 409 ff): the asymmetrical mode, which is the one used by consciousness, can only make use – in particular for representing the mind itself – of the means of visual representation at its disposal, that is to say, of three dimensions (plus that of time). In the end, what is multidimensional in the symmetrical mode becomes tridimensional in the asymmetrical mode. An illustration of this may be found in the way painting represents the multiple facets of an object. The first treatment, realistic, erases some of them (for example, the back of this object seen from in front is not represented). The second, cubist, in particular, ‘violates’ the asymmetry of consciousness: all the facets appear here on the same canvas at the same time, which the spectator simultaneously finds both impossible (it is not logical) and comprehensible (all the existing facets are juxtaposed, one by one). Likewise, a symmetrical psychological object comprises facets, condensed and simultaneous ‘dimensions’, which, in order to be perceived, must pass one by one through the gate leading to the subject’s awareness of them. Here is a clinical example of the passage of a significant number of condensed dimensions in the symmetrical mode (structurally unconscious) to their possible conscious–asymmetrical interpretations:




Fig. 1. Taken from Courant and Robbins, 1941, p.231




Fig. 2. Taken from Courant and Robbins, 1941, p.232

Shortly after having begun his analysis, A., an artist, decided to improve his skills in another town with a reputed teacher. His classes happened to be at the same time as his sessions. Should he stop his analysis? Or alternatively 'sacrifice' this training for his analysis? His acting out (choosing to do this training at that particular point) progressively revealed multiple significations: (a) fleeing a feared dependency on his analyst; (b) using a lateral transference on to the teacher to help him do this; (c) repeating a 'double life' situation with which he was already familiar; (d) struggling against the fear that the analyst might die (his father had committed suicide during his adolescence); (e) creating an ambiguous situation echoing his difficulties of identity (being both masculine and feminine), etc. Finally, these multiple, unconscious motivations converged towards a *single* scenario, aimed at allowing him to get away from the analyst. All these significations condensed into his *sole* acting out, that of beginning a training process incompatible with the analysis, could only be elaborated and interpreted 'one at a time'. They were thus *all latent at the same time*, but *could only be thought about one by one*.

And these different interpretations are all possible without some being 'good' and the others 'bad'.³

³I have passed from geometry *stricto sensu* to its more metaphorical meaning (the 'dimensions' of the unconscious). I have taken the liberty of making this semantic shift due to the necessity of presenting Matte Blanco schematically in this article. But we should certainly take seriously, as Matte Blanco stresses, the relations between mental representation in general and geometry. Do representations exist, at the conscious level at least, which can be formed without geometry? It is the case, for example, that, when we want to put the unconscious into words (thus give it a conscious representation), we constantly make use of terms such as displacement, condensation, splitting, projection, etc., all of which describe phenomena that occur in space.

Let us return now to our triangle ABC: two additional remarks (which, you will understand, can easily be applied to any higher number of dimensions) can be made:

- The points CABC can ‘lead back’ towards the original triangle ABC, but also towards an infinite number of other triangles. To imagine this, it suffices to think of all the planes at the intersection of which the line CABC is situated,⁴ planes from which the triangles A’B’C’, or A’’ B’’ C’’, etc., situated initially on these other planes, could also be projected on to it.
- And yet, at the same time as this freedom appears (an infinite number of original figures can account for the same line CABC), a constraint arises: in order for a line CABC to appear, the original figure – if it is situated on a two-dimensional plane – must be a triangle.

All these elements help us finally to understand how a single, indivisible given situation (e.g. a line CABC or the symbolic narrative of a patient) can give rise to an infinite number of interpretations (an infinite number of original triangles, or of interpretations of the origins of what the patient has said).

Here are some other elements which will be useful to us: firstly, the concept of the psychic zones of *Thinking, Feeling and Being*, and the notion of emotion as an equivalent of the unconscious;⁵ and, secondly, a comparison with Humpty Dumpty (Carroll, 1896, p. 192):

- Matte Blanco (1988, pp. 52 ff) has described psychic functioning in terms of strata: he speaks of a *constitutive bi-logical stratified structure* of the unconscious) in which the proportion of symmetrical and asymmetrical functioning is variable. The most superficial stratum is only comprised of asymmetrical relations between well delimited elements. Consequently, emotion is absent here and only *Thinking* exists. To give an example: if an individual sees a mouse, he regards it as an inoffensive rodent and is not afraid of it (no emotion). In the deeper strata, on the other hand, he may think of it as the representative of the class of dangerous animals and his emotive reactions will tend to be maximal (and in the case of consciousness being invaded by these deep symmetrical strata, a phobia will arise). Or alternatively: a paranoid patient does not distinguish the individuals he meets but considers them as representatives – equivalent with each other – of the class of potential persecutors. Here the affect, *Feeling* (anxiety), and the idea, *Thinking* (of threat), will not be separate elements: each of them are inseparable parts of one and the same ‘emotional thinking’. In the deep-lying strata, affect can thus be projected on to multiple circumstances (e.g. all persecutors). It is thus multidimensional. It is worth noting in passing, however, that in the ‘Basic Matrix’, the total fusion of the elements with each other means that relations can no longer exist between them,

⁴Planes which are situated around them like blades around their axis.

⁵Accordingly, the title of the book Matte Blanco wrote in 1988 is *Thinking, Feeling and Being*.

because, for this to be possible, these relations must obtain between distinct objects. Here, quite simply, we are no longer in the order of *Happening* but of *Being*: everything is indistinguishable in an immanence where nothing happens but where there is simply 'being'. Lastly, in order for the mind or psyche to function healthily, cohabitation and circulation between the strata must be possible (for instance, a father and an analyst who are clearly distinguished at the conscious level can, at the same time, be indistinguishable at a deeper level). The cohabitation of the strata, and thus of asymmetrical and symmetrical modes, is called *bi-logic*.

- *Humpty Dumpty*, Lewis Carroll's egg-like character (1886, p. 192), as we know, fell off a wall on which he was sitting and the pieces could never be put together again:

Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall: / Humpty Dumpty had a great fall / All the King's horses and all the King's men / Couldn't put Humpty together again.

If, like Matte Blanco (1975, p. 367), we think about Humpty Dumpty, we can imagine an infinite number of different potential lines of fracture for any egg (any original entity) which breaks. By the same token, a unique and indivisible fact (for example, an analysand's narrative, of symbolic and emotional value) can give rise to a multiplicity of logical divisions (ways of understanding and interpreting what the patient says).

In this way, we can also understand how the pieces of egg that we can obtain are quite different from each other according to the different potential lines of fracture. Or, alternatively, in the case of a psychic fact, logical divisions in terms of a Kleinian, Bionian, Matte Blancian or Freudian perspective, etc., are not congruent, but simply different ways of cracking the egg. The consequence of this is very important for it leads us to suppose that there is not just one psychoanalysis but several, each applying to different objects. So I do not agree with Bernardi (1989) when he writes:

Does this mean that the *unity of psychoanalysis* must be given up for lost? I think not, our *unity* lies in the shared field of problems rather than in the answers we may give them.

(p. 354, my italics)

But I think rather, like Michels (2007), that:

... Psychoanalysis is not a 'defined method of therapy', but rather *a number of different therapies* (perhaps more today than in the past) that share a history, many concepts and ideas, many surface similarities, and a community of discourses. *However, they do not share a uniformity of method, agreement on what is essential...*

(p. 1725, my italics)

We often ask ourselves the question whether a psychoanalytic treatment can ever really be considered as terminated one day. Now it can never really be completely concluded for the potential lines of fracture of the original

psychic egg are limitless in number: another interpretation can always be made after those that already exist.

We could nourish the hope, by putting all the pieces together again, of reconstituting the original 'egg', the psychic fact brought by the patient. However, even if we imagine, which is already absurd in itself, that we can use all the possible epistemologies to account for all the facets of one and the same psychic fact, we would still not arrive at the symmetrical (indivisible) original egg, but only at an "... egg – a world – that is cracked" (Matte Blanco, 1975a, p. 367). Asymmetrical attempts – even the most skilful – to think about/interpret the symmetrical and indivisible felt experience will therefore never be anything but words; words which will only be able to give an approximate account of it, just as similar attempts to think about/interpret a poem suggest an emotion without ever being able to reach it and to replace it completely.

So, by using Matte Blanco's basic hypotheses, we understand even better how we can accept a multiplicity of epistemologies without having to set them in competition with each other.

Two texts by Matte Blanco

In *On interpretation*, Matte Blanco (1968) shows that:

- The most common prejudice amongst analysts, who are often deaf to one another, consists in thinking that there exists an ideal interpretation for a given psychic fact, and that the first elucidates the second with the same pertinence as a single, unique key opens the one and only lock that corresponds to it.
- Now, for one and the same area of reality, several 'keys' exist, all of which are valid, which Matte Blanco calls 'interpretative equivalents'. For example, one of his patients either completely rejects his interpretations, or he accepts them enthusiastically while noting, however, that he has already thought about what Matte Blanco has just said to him. Matte Blanco mentions several formulations that can be given to the patient. The first consists in simply pointing out his reactions. The second, in saying to him, 'You seem to reject anything you don't already know.' Different analysts can also introduce different nuances. Thus one could say to the patient that his unwillingness to accept new things stems from the fact that he does not control them. Or, alternatively, that he is afraid of taking something inside himself that might hurt or destroy him. A classical Freudian might work on the dimension of fear of homosexual penetration; and a Kleinian on the fear of introjecting a harmful object or envy towards the breast which is offered as a gift to the patient in the guise of an interpretation. Several formulations are legitimate, says Matte Blanco: they are 'interpretative equivalents'. That is to say, if their formulation is understood differently at a conscious level in each case, at a deeper level, unconsciously, they will be considered by the patient as equivalent members of the same class of interpretations concerning the Propositional Function uniting them

analogically – that is, the fear of “dangerous objects being introduced into the interior of the person’s body” (Matte Blanco, 1968, p. 208). This helps us to understand, adds Matte Blanco, how one can make errors without disturbing the efficacy of the treatment: “Something that was a mistake at a superficial level may at a deeper level hit the mark because of the formation of ever wider classes” (Matte Blanco, 1968, p. 208), he writes, engaging in a dialogue with the famous question of Glover (1931) concerning *The therapeutic effect of inexact interpretation: A contribution to the theory of suggestion*. Glover proposed that inexact interpretations could be therapeutic notwithstanding their ‘falseness’, for they may be said to help the patient construct a sort of new symptom. The false interpretation, in his view, binds the instinctual tensions that adequate analytic work has already reduced considerably and the inexact interpretation thus leads to this sort of new symptom, which may be likened to pathological phobia. It is clear how far the perspective opened up by Matte Blanco’s ‘interpretative equivalents’ is different from Glover’s.

- Matte Blanco also shows that one and the same area of reality can involve multiple problematic issues (owing to the multidimensionality of the unconscious). To back this up, he mentions a patient, who, in his analysis, started dreaming that *he was having sexual relations with a woman of a completely different kind to his fiancée*. Then, in another dream, the patient *found himself in his parents’ bed with his fiancée, but he was then unable to have an erection*. Several interpretations of the dream are plausible. The first is that oedipal guilt prevented him from having relations with his fiancée. But also, as the other girl was the sister of one of his friends, one may suppose that homosexual wishes were involved, especially as this woman had been very masculine as a little girl. Moreover, as the patient’s father interfered in his marital affairs, the patient was able to reject his fiancée as representing a choice induced by his father and, as such, to reject her (he did not want to fall into his father’s clutches and reproduce his way of life); lastly, we can speak of a classical split between the object of his affection (the fiancée) and that of his sexual love (the other woman). Should one of these interpretations be chosen as the one that is true (the others being considered as false)? This is not Matte Blanco’s view: if several paths lead to the Rome of truth, it is because the latter has a great number of facets to it and we do not have the means to grasp the *entire* truth of a patient.

These 1968 considerations can be linked up with those published in 1975a (pp. 152 ff) on how the symbolism used by the psyche is the vehicle of infinite possible meanings. Matte Blanco wants to emphasize “the unique position of psycho-analysis among scientific systems” and to answer Popper who refuses to grant psychoanalysis a scientific status on the grounds that it lacks the possibility of being refuted whereas, on the contrary, it always finds numerous possibilities of confirmation. And Matte Blanco then moves in Popper’s direction by saying that, yes, indeed, numerous predictions can be included in analysis since it is concerned with symbols. Now the symbol

is a consequence and the visible manifestation of the symmetrical mode, and, consequently, *each unique* symbol may represent an *infinite* number of objects or situations. This is the converse, then, of phenomena studied in a classical scientific manner where, on the contrary, *a* given situation must result from *a* precise determinism. But, on the other hand, if, on the surface, the symbol, which is well differentiated asymmetrically, seems unique (for example, it is a precise vase that is drawn), at a deeper level it is indistinguishable from the infinite range of objects that it may represent and with which it shares a common characteristic (for example, the characteristic of being a container is shared by the vase, the maternal body, an automobile, etc.). In this way, Matte Blanco shows (1975a, p. 315) that a breast may represent (symbolize) for the unconscious:

any actual human or animal breast / any rounded object / any soft object / any warm object / any object that can be put in the mouth / any object that can furnish physical nourishment / any situation that can furnish physical nourishment / any object that can furnish psychological nourishment / any person that can furnish, offer or promise psychological nourishment / any situation that can furnish psychological nourishment / any of the above combined in all the possible forms / all the above together / the protective earth / the protective universe / and, according to circumstances, an infinite number of other possibilities.

This once again lends support to the hypothesis that a psychic conjunction – which is a fantasy combination made up of multiple elements and thus considerably more complex than a unique element like ‘the breast’, for instance – can correspond to an infinite number of unconscious matching elements and thus to an infinite number of interpretations and epistemologies, concerning which it cannot be claimed that some are true and others false.

A link with the methodology of scientific psychology

It is interesting to bring what has been said above into relation with the rules of reasoning that guide the methodology of scientific psychological research. Importing these into our clinical work allows us to see it from a new angle. Admittedly, these rules do not account for all the *objects* of the knowledge of mental life, and what we have just said about the symbol is the main reason for this (one and the same clinical object can assume an infinite number of analogical derivatives). Nevertheless, as far as the *logical method* itself of this scientific thought is concerned, certain points can be useful to us. Furthermore, this is not unrelated to Matte Blanco’s distinction between asymmetrical and symmetrical modes and their inter-relationship.

The book by Robert *et al.* (1988), *Fondements et étapes de la recherche scientifique en psychologie* [Foundations and Stages of Scientific Research in Psychology], allows us to reconsider the following ideas.

First of all, when we turn our attention towards mental life, we are not dealing with a direct subject of observation as is the case in sciences based on a physical support. The entities on which we work to account for reality are abstract and cannot be perceived. For instance, concepts such as libido, death instinct,

repression, etc., however necessary their inference seems to us, nonetheless remain unperceived. Hence the famous words of Freud (1933, p. 95):

The theory of the instincts is so to say our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them clearly.

These concepts thus remain approximations of the objects studied and one must not confuse the observed object (its supposed reality) and the observing object (the analyst who theorizes). The consequence of this for research (and for our reasoning) is that, strictly speaking, we cannot *verify* these hypotheses but, *at the most, show that they are not contradicted by what we observe*. For example, observing clinically the self-destructiveness of certain patients does not prove that the death instinct exists; it simply shows that these clinical observations do not enter into contradiction with the hypothesis of a death instinct to which they can be linked.

The knowledge of facts is hypothetical rather than final and remains constantly open to correction. The solutions given by science are never given as definitive and final. This, too, has major consequences for our reasoning. For example, if we interpret to an anorexic patient that she is trying to get rid of the bad parts of herself by projecting them on to her body, and our interpretation seems to help her get better, that does not mean that the theory of splitting has been proven once again; it simply means that, in the present state of our thinking, the facts observed and this theory have some points of concordance (or better, of non-contradiction) and, furthermore, that we are still waiting for a more global theory which will subsequently be able to account for this conjunction in a different manner. In fact, science does not rest – the comparison is Popper's (1959, p. 111) – upon “rock-bottom” but on “piles” which do not go down to “a natural or given base”, but go deep enough, nonetheless, to be able to carry the edifice of theoretical understanding “at least for the time being”. The same may be said, it seems to me, for our clinical and metapsychological advances.

All this is borne out by clinical experience:

B., a young female patient in analysis said that a mature man had just tried to seduce her. But she did not respond to her own sexual excitement and felt a keen sense of satisfaction at having been able, for once, she said, “to say no to her desire”. Giving in to it would have been to repeat situations of seduction and abuse suffered during her adolescence. She was happy to see that she had been able, “simply by thinking”, to resist an inner impulsion.

Her wish to be seduced by me (‘the mature man’) and her satisfaction at having been able to deny herself are evident. But I did not choose this line of transference interpretation. *I pointed out instead that it was very valuable for her to be able to develop this possibility of internal dialogue between bodily excitation and the head which thinks, and that it was an important step forward.*

An association showed the new psychological movement that was occurring in her. A dream from the beginning of the analysis came back to her memory: her body was fragmented in it. But many things had changed, she

commented: she had recently looked at some photos of herself in which her body was whole. She found herself “pretty” in them. Before, she systematically avoided looking at her photos. She now felt “much more herself” and “much happier in herself”.

So the main thread of our work and the interpretation that I proposed to her seemed to help her strengthen her sense of psychical and bodily unity, which was attested by her association to her photograph. Hinshelwood (2008, p. 512) points out that the associative response to an interpretation is the test of the whether the latter tallies with a significant point in the patient.

Such a sequence raises the question of the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ interpretation. If I had followed the guidelines that my analytic training ‘à la française’⁶ proposed to me internally, I should have interpreted *the transference*, to which priority is given in my country. But, having worked for several years with other authors (see Lombardi, 2004, 2008), I have become more sensitive to the help that a patient derives from an intervention, as Ferrari (2004) has proposed, which leads him (or her) to link up, *within himself*, his mind and his emotions (bodily in particular). An analyst from my school would thus say, I imagine, that the interpretation given to my patient is ‘false’ insofar as it seems to neglect the transference. Now if I apply the rules of reasoning of the scientific psychology that I have just mentioned to this clinical situation, what I can say about it appears in quite a different light.

I can now consider:

- not that the hypothesis of a difficulty of non-integration between body and mind is the only acceptable one to qualify this patient, but simply that this hypothesis is not incompatible with the evolution of this session, in view of the fresh associations that followed my interpretation;
- that the hypothesis of a transference issue is not incompatible either with the material brought by the patient (moreover, this transference path proved explorable in subsequent sessions where the material corresponded once again to the condensed figure of the analyst–seducer);
- that these two hypotheses are not to be classified in terms of one of them being ‘true’ and the other ‘false’, but as different ‘pieces’ of the patient’s psychical reality. The discovery of a piece from the shell of Humpty Dumpty does not contradict the possibility that other pieces can be discovered which are no less ‘true’ than it, but which simply have a different shape.
- that, as I no longer hold to certitudes of the kind: ‘This *is* the truth’, but only to statements of the type: ‘This *is not incompatible with* the truth that I am trying to demonstrate, or at least with the transitory hypothesis that I have formulated in respect of it’, still other hypotheses remain possible: namely: (a) that there is perhaps yet another explanation for the patient’s progress and well-being, something other than the

⁶I am aware that, in fact, as Séchaud (2008) notes, one cannot in reality place all the French analysts under a single banner; the nuances in their practice vary. Let us just say that I am mentioning an important trend in my country.

contents I formulated to her – perhaps, for example, our shared experience of sympathy and emotional authenticity; or alternatively, our shared confidence in the efficacy of analysis; (b) that another theoretical-clinical perspective will perhaps subsequently illuminate in a more global manner the two hypotheses formulated above; (c) that this may not be the case and that yet another issue is involved here – namely, that I will have to tolerate the fact that this situation faces me with a great deal that is unknown, and even that this unknown dimension will not necessarily be totally elucidated one day (this is where Bion's “negative capacity” (1970, p. 125) has its relevance).

It is plain, then, that there is a radical change of perspective. Is it possible to imagine the psychoanalytical literature rewritten in this way? Authors would no longer say: ‘The patient's reaction shows the importance of interpreting the narcissistic wound ... or of uncovering transgenerational difficulties ... or aggressivity in the transference ...’, but: ‘The patient's reaction is not incompatible with the hypothesis of the importance of his narcissistic problems ... not incompatible with the hypothesis of the weight of his transgenerational identifications ... with that of his difficulties in managing his aggressivity ... and, furthermore, all this does not close the field of possible reflections.’

But how do these considerations concern the consequences of Matte Blanco's thinking on epistemology? They do so insofar as the first formulation (of the type: ‘This is the true interpretation’) offers the hope of attaining a global object which would be as whole as the egg before its fall and fragmentation. *We would thus have access to the symmetrical and indivisible mode.* By interesting ourselves in the ‘true or right’ interpretation, we would be claiming, in fact, to reach something which ‘is’, which ‘exists’, the stratum of ‘*Being*’. By opting for a more modest degree of understanding (‘This does not contradict the hypothesis that ...’), we must give up this hope and content ourselves with a non-incompatibility with a reality that can never be wholly attained, content ourselves with ‘*Thinking*’, which, at the very most, perhaps, is not without a point of contact with ‘*Being*’, but cannot sum it up. Our function as psychoanalysts even requires us to distance us from our immediate experience so that we can think about it. Thus it induces suffering linked to the fact of cutting ourselves off from our affects in order to think (even if at other times we take them into account, for instance, in the countertransference). Now in thinking that we can find the ‘true or right’ answers to our questions, we nourish the hope of being able to reduce the split that exists between the two modes: asymmetric (*Thinking*) and symmetric (*Feeling and Being*). By so doing, we seek to construct certainties for ourselves with the hope of being immersed by virtue of them in an immanent truth: in sum, by apparently distancing ourselves from the indivisible mode of felt experience in order to think about it, we would in fact not really deprive ourselves of this experience since we would enter into direct contact with it.

Can we reduce the number of imaginable interpretations?

This is indeed a complex question and Matte Blanco throws new light on certain aspects of it.

I shall leave ethics to one side, even though it plays a major role in guiding us. *Primum non nocere*: we must reduce the number of possible interpretations by avoiding traumatizing interpretations, for example. But although this is a consideration of major importance, I shall not dwell on it here as it does not fall within the scope of this paper.

Focusing on what can be deduced from Matte Blanco's propositions, I shall begin by recalling that the psychic fact in general, and psychoanalysis in particular (Green 1995, p. 292) are placed between nature and culture and raise questions pertaining both to the sciences of nature and those of the mind (Bell, 2009; Engel, 1996, 1997; Hanly, 2009). Speaking schematically, the first correspond to a hermeneutic approach, and the second to an approach based on observation, even if this dichotomy can be subject to major nuances (Wallerstein, 2009, p. 112).

From the hermeneutic perspective, it is the mind itself which creates its own meaning, which, by nature, cannot be accounted for by external observation. This, for example, is what led Ricoeur (1965, p. 378) to write:

... Psychoanalysis is an exegetical science bearing on the relations of meaning between substituted objects and the original (and lost) objects of the drives where the psyche creates its own meaning for itself.

What counts henceforth, then, is the coherence of the reasoning conducted (for the arguments concerning coherence, concordance and pragmatism as criteria of the truth in analysis, see Hanly, 2009); so this allows us genuine freedom to construct epistemologies in very large numbers. For example, we can develop a theory of the mind which is built on the cornerstone of the theory of the *drives*; but equally we might just as well have pointed up the need for *adaptation* of living organisms in order to understand the primordial rules of the mind and to create another metapsychology. Another example is the religious sphere: we may consider that the latter should remain outside our epistemological choices or not, as the case may be (there are many who pray in order to heal themselves mentally). In short, here, the premises dictate the reasoning that follows.

On the contrary, if one is a naturalist, it is observation, in particular clinical observation that must guide us, as well as its concordance with the theory. In this case, we refer to that which is external to us and which can thus claim to have a degree of objectivity, a real existence. In the field of psychoanalysis, what is observed is what we perceive about the patient in the treatment (his unconscious dynamics, his associations which follow our interpretations, the modifications of his defensive dynamics, the retroactive effects of our interventions, the countertransference, etc.). In the context of this observationist perspective, I will return to two 'classical' texts to show how the question of a choice that restricts the number of avenues of approach to the mind on the basis of clinical experience can be enriched by

the considerations arising from Matte Blanco's work which I have already mentioned.

Bernardi (1989), inquiring into the effect of paradigms on analytic thought, gives an illustration of this with reference to the 'Wolf Man'. After recalling how Freud, Klein, Lacan and Leclaire dealt with the same material, he shows how each author's respective paradigms predetermined the elements that he chose or did not choose to select from his clinical observations. Thus Freud sees in the case of the Wolf Man the illustration of a typical unconscious psychosexual conflict; Klein, on the other hand, is interested in primary anxieties (fears of being devoured) and their projections on to the wolf; finally, Lacan and Leclaire emphasize the wolf as a significant element determining the position of the subject and his desire. Thus each one finds in the case he is dealing with confirmations of the paradigm that he brings to it, and sees what the filter that he has placed on the lens selects for him. Bernardi (1989, p. 347) reminds us, then, that paradigms, even if they are incommensurable with each other (that is, incomparable because they do not in fact treat of the same material), are often presented as being unique tools for reading psychoanalysis – unique in the sense that each of them purports to provide the only valid interpretation of a given clinical material; and unique in the sense that they claim to originate from the same source, namely, Freud's thinking, for Lacan and Klein present themselves as having followed in Freud's footsteps. But in reality, as Bernardi shows, very different conceptualizations are hidden under the same terms used by the different authors (drive, unconscious, repression, etc.). In theory, the paradigm should thus be only one *particular* way of seeing the material in question, but in practice it is often used for hegemonic purposes and tends to be confused with the *universal* way which should be used to approach the material concerned. Bernardi (p. 342) is of the opinion that the different psychoanalytic theories cannot be mixed, that they are not cumulative, that they do not proceed from each other, and that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On these points, I am in agreement with him, but I do not entirely agree, however, when he concedes (p. 354), somewhat regretfully, that paradigms are indispensable "parasites" for metabolizing experience, but parasites that can take up too much space in our minds as if they were ultimate reality. I think, in fact, that these parasites are the only tools available for thinking, particular forms of diffraction of the symmetrical indivisible whole, and that therefore, by definition, they are incomplete and partial. But it cannot be any other way. Making use of paradigms is not a false way of thinking for all thought is necessarily partial. Once the egg has cracked along certain lines, it can no longer do so along others. Each line of fracture only describes one trajectory and, if we want to cut up the egg, it is necessary to provoke one, that is, to choose a particular 'parasite'. Where Bernardi thinks that "paradigmatic parasites" can take up too much space, I would point out that we have no other tools for thinking about the psyche. The problem therefore does not reside – and what Matte Blanco has shown us about the way in which the indivisible mode is projected on to the asymmetrical mode helps us to think about it like this – in the fact that paradigms are not comparable with each other

since they do not speak about the same thing, but in the fact that we tend to take them to be the only way of thinking about experience. There is a danger, otherwise, of believing that an egg can only crack in one way and that one can reconstitute it *ad integrum* by virtue of a single conceptual tool.

Britton and Steiner (1994) show that it is clinically important to distinguish the 'selected fact' and the 'overvalued idea'. In both cases, an intuition is formed in the analyst who connects in his mind elements concerning his patient which hitherto were not connected with each other. This leads to interpretations but it is not possible, however, to see right away if this intuition stems from a reliable perception or from an error. Only the patient's associative response will confirm this. This monitoring of interpretation and the reactions (conscious and unconscious) to it is similar to the way a musician listens to his violin as he is tuning it, say the authors. Two clinical examples are given. The first is that of an adequate 'selected fact' and concerns a woman patient, who, in a dream *that takes place on a mountain peak, confuses her personal progress and the downward slope*. The analyst is then able to show her that she treats as equivalents transference weaning, moving on and developing along autonomous lines (thus representing progress), and putting herself in a position of inferiority (the downward slope). Although irritated, the patient confirms the value of this interpretation: different associations and new interpretations then make it possible to unravel a leading thread whereby she discovers that her envy towards the analyst's penis is linked to a sense of inferiority towards him and to a need to control everything. On the contrary, the 'overvalued idea' is based on an error and may contain defensive elements belonging to the analyst, attempts to forcefully inject into the patient's mind theoretical or clinical elements disconnected with the latter's psychical reality. In a second example, an analyst proposes an interpretation to an obsessional patient linking difficulties in waiting, anality (literally named as such in the interpretation), preoccupations with money and a need to control everything (immediately, however, the analyst realizes how theoretical his interpretation sounds, that it is influenced by his recent reading and that the patient may experience it as being forced). The patient responds to this interpretation by an association: a few days before, he had been waiting for his girlfriend at the theatre, but upstairs on the first floor, while she was waiting for him downstairs at the bar. This shows, then, the discrepancy that exists between the patient's internal reality and the interpretation given by the analyst who, in short, 'is on the wrong interpretative level', as his analysis suggests to him (all this will lead, moreover, to a subsequent elaboration).

In the face of such considerations, Matte Blanco helps us to elaborate several lines of thought. Namely: (a) it is interesting to reduce the number of interpretations that can be proposed to the patient when one has the hope that these will meet an unconscious thread already present in him: for *one* lock – i.e. this thread – there is *one* corresponding interpretative key, the interpretation, or at least *one type* of key (the 'interpretative equivalents'). Here the legitimate constraint of wanting to reduce the number of proposable interpretations aims to treat them as 'selected facts' standing in an analogical relationship to a conjunction or Functional Proposition that is

already present in the patient's unconscious. Asymmetrization, that is, the clear delimitation of the right interpretation(s) is to be sought after and the 'overvalued idea' is to be avoided; (b) but as the principles of Generalization and Symmetry rule more and more when one gets deeper and deeper into the unconscious—symmetrical mode, finally, *any* interpretation that is offered to the patient will have a certain value because it will always be analogical to what he said, even if in a very loose way. For example, the analogy existing between the patient's and the analyst's psyche may simply be that they both share the Propositional Function 'desire to create meaning together'. Now, for patients with a weak capacity for representation [*Darstellbarkeit*] the question of the 'selected fact' or of the 'overvalued idea' does not arise in the same way since the patient does not have a psychological 'lock' to propose; there is no unconscious conflict to be found, but mainly voids and tears in the psychic texture. In such cases, *both the key and the lock must be invented*. Saying 'anything whatsoever' (or almost, while nonetheless taking care not to traumatize the patient) will then be of value and will be a 'key' with very imprecise contours but one, at least, that will correspond to the lock in him – namely, the need to 'communicate in order to create meaning where there is as yet none'. The infinite number of derivatives of the mind, and in particular the mental formations of the analyst's mind, can then be used with a great deal of freedom. But by acting in this way, analysts are often afraid of imposing a meaning on the patient which is theirs and not his, and thus of making a 'false' interpretation. However, once again, that question does not arise because the issue here is one of proposing 'grafts of ideas' that the patient can make his own and not to discover a latent meaning. With such patients, speaking of factual events, 'about the rain and the fine weather', and supplying our own ideas (e.g. 'If I were in your situation, I think I would feel this or that ...'), develops and consolidates the mental fabric. The fear of proposing false interpretations can thus be set aside by considering that everything in the psyche can communicate with everything else (at the indivisible level of the deep strata of the symmetrical mode). This may be compared with the ideas of Glover (1931). Glover recommended keeping silent rather than proposing an inexact interpretation: "The moral is of course that, unless one is sure of one's ground, it is better to keep silent" (1931, p. 401). Now it is clear that one can, on the contrary, in certain cases, invert this perspective and consider that, when the unconscious psychic material is missing, it is much better not to remain silent and to create any sort of meaning rather than allowing a void to open up under the patient's feet. So it is less the content of the interpretation that counts than the identification with an analyst whose mind is endowed with transformational capacities (Bollas, 1975). As Bergstein says (2009, p. 617), drawing notably on Alvarez, Meltzer and Anzieu, the therapeutic work here consists "of filling with meaning something that is void of meaning"; (c) in return, such a consideration (in the indivisible mode everything communicates) also sheds new light on those situations where an underlying meaning is present in the patient. In such cases, should we propose just one (interpretative) key for one lock, that of the 'selected fact'? In fact, this is probably simply impossible. Admittedly, one can imagine that a prevalent trend exists

(for example, in the case of B., at one moment or another, it was necessary to propose an interpretation to her concerning the transference confusion of analyst–seducer). But that does not prevent the analyst from being the one who chooses, albeit in different ways, the preferred path for developing meaning (see above, Bernardi, 1989, on the choice of this or that paradigm). In other words, alongside a ‘good/true’ prevalent interpretation, there always exist multiple other possible ones. This is why we can (and in reality we do) break the egg in a Freudian, Kleinian, Lacanian manner, etc. In sum, an approach such as Matte Blanco’s can help us to accept more readily an inherent feature of contemporary psychoanalysis, namely, its diversity which renders the era of reductionisms obsolete. Thus, for example, in an exceptional issue in 2007, the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* brought together famous authors of international psychoanalysis around the theme ‘Comparing theories of therapeutic action’. One could see just how diverse the different approaches were and how much discussion there was between them. Different conceivable theoretico-clinical approaches were considered one after the other; but one may also add that, within one and the same treatment, whether one likes it or not, different therapeutic approaches are combined, whether or not the analyst is conscious of it. On this subject, I would refer the reader in particular to the extremely didactic article by Gabbard and Western (2003). These authors show that, alongside classical interpretations, the analyst’s insight and the patient’s acquisition of insight or understanding, therapeutic factors can be combined: the quality of the relation developed during the treatment, the analyst’s enactments, the reconstructions made ... and even ‘secondary’ strategies such as suggestion, the patient’s confrontation with his dysfunctional beliefs, the evaluation of his strategies for resolving problems or for taking decisions, exposure to his phobogenic ideas, etc., etc. Faced with such complexity, a single theory is definitely no longer sufficient. An exhaustive review of the literature on this subject is not my intention but I would, however, also refer the reader to Canestri (2006) and Tuckett (2008, especially Chapter 5).

To conclude: Pluralism and the analyst’s affects

Matte Blanco also helps us to see why pluralism poses a problem for the analyst *from an affective point of view*. We cling to our theories for several reasons (Poland, 2009): the narcissistic investment that we make in them, the pseudo-intellectual mastery that they seem to offer, and the group adhesion that they permit. Matte Blanco allows us to add an additional perspective. If, for the mind, the possibility of having an emotional life and the sense of feeling that we exist are rooted in the symmetrical mode (that of *Feeling* and *Being*), it is understandable that maintaining contact with it is essential. There exists a “desire for the invisible mode” (Matte Blanco, 1988, p. 218), to which pluralism runs directly contrary since it supposes by definition a dissection into distinct elements. This desire is based, says Matte Blanco (1975b) in his text, *Creatività ed ortodossia* [Creativity and orthodoxy], on nostalgia for the time when the baby experienced himself as being one with his mother. There is thus a desire to return to this ‘unitary’ state before the

frustrating separation which underlies subject–object distinction and individuation. The fantasy of being able to find a single epistemology accounting for the whole of the mind echoes that of being able to communicate once again with the mythical lost Breast. Melanie Klein (1957, p. 46) has shown that the breast was the prototype of the infinite goodness of the mother and of all creation. This “unitary” desire can be satisfied by “one” single elected theory, by belonging to “just one group”. I proposed above that the attempts of psychoanalysts to situate themselves in the *Thinking* mode made them nostalgic for their *Feeling* and *Being* mode. So they have to find a strategy to get around this risk: this may involve cultivating a universal breast-theory. Furthermore, Matte Blanco develops the idea that, once separation from the mother has occurred, the subject has only one choice: either to merge with the lost breast (and so lose once again his individuation, which is intolerable), or to kill the breast and become the breast himself (eliminating the frustrating breast and turning oneself into an absolutely self-sufficient breast). This is the dilemma of the creative person: in having become a creator by attributing to himself the powers of the breast, and by murdering the latter, he has carried out a ‘self-breastification–self-deification’ by means of a ‘breasticide–deicide’ which goes with it. Hence the extreme attitudes when faced with a new creation which is felt to be like the murder of Gods whose breast-theories were hitherto venerated. These questions directly concern the reactions of analysts to epistemologies. Very often, they approach them as if they were referring to absolute divinities (psychoanalysis according to Saint Freud, Saint Melanie, Saint Winnicott or Saint Matte Blanco ...) and every innovator–protester is regarded as the perpetrator of a deicide who must be silenced (... before he himself, eventually, is deified in turn). These affective factors torture psychoanalysts and regularly lead to major crises. They should be identified and explored *at the beginning* of every analyst’s training process. This would help analysts, knowing from the outset that the unity of psychoanalysis can only be founded on its diversity, not feeling torn apart by contact with theories as different as those that we are faced with and, eventually, avoiding many useless anathemas.

Translations of summary

Das Denken Matte Blancos und der erkenntnistheoretische Pluralismus in der Psychoanalyse. Obwohl in der Psychoanalyse ein breiter Pluralismus beobachtet werden kann, herrscht noch immer ein Geist der Intoleranz zwischen den verschiedenen theoretischen Schulen. Die Arbeiten Matte Blancos ermöglichen es, über diese Fragen auf neue Weise nachzudenken. Die direkte psychische Erfahrung, die als unteilbares Ganzes empfunden wird, erwächst aus einem symmetrischen Modus (nahe dem Unbewussten) und projiziert sich in nicht verdichteter und vielfacher Weise in den asymmetrischen Modus (Bewusstsein, Denken). Deshalb können psychische Sachverhalte (beispielsweise das, was der Patient während einer Sitzung sagt und fühlt) durch zahlreiche bewusste Repräsentationen erklärt werden, die sich dennoch untereinander nicht widersprechen (wie sie das z.B. in verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätzen tun). Affektive Faktoren, die mit der Hoffnung auf eine Wiederbelebung „ozeanischer Gefühle“ von Verschmelzung mit einer einheitlichen und einigenden Theorie vom Subjekt-Analytiker verbunden sind, werden ebenfalls untersucht, insoweit sie zu einer Tendenz unter den Analytikern führen, sich gegenseitig auszuschließen.

El pensamiento de Matte Blanco y el pluralismo epistemológico en psicoanálisis. Puede afirmarse que, si bien notamos la existencia de un mayor pluralismo psicoanalítico, todavía hay un espíritu de

intolerancia entre las distintas escuelas teóricas. La obra de Matte Blanco permite pensar estas cuestiones de manera inédita. La experiencia psíquica directa, vivenciada como una totalidad indivisible, se desprende de la modalidad simétrica (cerca al inconsciente) y se proyecta de manera múltiple y descondensada sobre la modalidad asimétrica (conciencia, pensamiento). Así, podemos dar cuenta de los hechos psíquicos (por ejemplo, lo que el paciente dice y siente durante la sesión) mediante múltiples representaciones conscientes que, sin embargo, no son contradictorias entre sí (por ejemplo, mediante distintos enfoques teóricos). También se exploran los factores afectivos ligados a la esperanza de restablecer un 'sentimiento oceánico' de fusión con una teoría unificada y unificadora del sujeto-analista, en su capacidad de generar la exclusión de unos analistas por parte de otros.

La pensée de Matte Blanco et le pluralisme épistémologique en psychanalyse. On note à la fois à la fois un pluralisme psychanalytique majeur et, pourtant, un esprit d'intolérance entre les différentes écoles théoriques. Matte Blanco permet d'envisager ces questions d'une façon renouvelée. L'expérience psychique directe, ressentie comme une, ressortit du mode symétrique (proche de l'inconscient) et se projette d'une façon décondensée et multiple sur le mode asymétrique (la conscience, la pensée). Ainsi, on peut rendre compte des faits psychiques (par exemple de ce que dit et ressent le patient en séance) par des représentations conscientes multiples et pourtant non contradictoires entre elles (par exemple par différentes approches théoriques). Les facteurs affectifs liés à l'espoir de renouer avec un « sentiment océanique » de fusion avec une théorie unifiée et unifiante du sujet-analyste sont également explorés en tant que générateurs d'exclusion des analystes les uns par les autres.

Il pensiero di Matte Blanco e il pluralismo epistemologico in psicoanalisi. Sebbene si percepisca, nel campo della psicoanalisi, un dilagare del pluralismo, permane tuttavia uno spirito di intolleranza fra le diverse scuole di pensiero. Il lavoro di Matte Blanco ci offre la possibilità di pensare a queste dissonanze in modo rinnovato. L'esperienza psichica diretta, percepita come entità indivisibile, proviene dalla modalità simmetrica (vicina all'inconscio) e si proietta in modo multiplo e de-condensato nella modalità asimmetrica (il conscio, il pensiero). In tal modo sarebbe possibile rendere conto degli eventi psichici (per esempio ciò che dice e sente il paziente nel corso della seduta) mediante rappresentazioni cosce multiple non necessariamente contraddittorie fra loro (per esempio ricorrendo a diversi approcci teorici). Vengono inoltre esplorati fattori affettivi legati a 'sentimenti oceanici' di fusione che suscitano la speranza di ottenere una teoria unificata e unificante della diade analitica in quanto portano all'esclusione reciproca di analisti di scuole diverse.

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